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THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT




I. Introduction and Key CRA Elements
The Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")1 was adopted fifteen
years ago to curb redlining, the discriminatory mortgage lending
practice whereby lenders refuse to make loans to certain geographic
areas based on the racial or ethnic composition of those areas or the
age of their housing stock. The law reflected the Congressional judg-
ment that lending institutions were overlooking important credit
needs within their local communities and that the banking regulators'
efforts were inadequate to deter this neglect.2 Although the law was
rarely enforced, some organized community groups made it work.
Today's climate of bank restructuring presents new challenges to
making the law effective.
The CRA is premised upon the view that although they are pri-
vately capitalized, banks and savings institutions are subject to an un-
derlying charter obligation to serve the banking needs of their local
communities. These public obligations form the quid pro quo for the
extensive government backing that is provided to these types of finan-
cial institutions (federal backing for deposit insurance, access to the
Federal Reserve System's lender of last resort facility).3
Further, the CRA's enactment represented a rebuke to the federal
* General Counsel, Center for Community Change. The author directs the
Center's Neighborhood Revitalization Project and provided legal representation for the
first successful challenge to a bank expansion application under the Community Reinvest-
ment Act. Further, he has authored numerous articles and publications on the CRA and
fair lending enforcement. Mr. Fishbein is an officer of the National Community Rein-
vestment Coalition and has served on the Federal Reserve Board's Consumer Advisory
Council. He received his law degree from Antioch School of Law, is a member of the
District of Columbia Bar and a recipient of the Bar's Consumer Lawyer of the Year
honors.
1. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-128, §§ 801-806, 91 Stat.
1147 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. III 1991)).
2. See Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S. 406 Before the Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1977).
3. JONATHAN BROWN, ESSENTIAL INFORMATION/BANKING RESEARCH PROJECT,
COMMUNITY BENEFIT REQUIREMENTS FOR BANKING INSTITUTIONS: THE U.S. EXPE-
RIENCE 1 (1991) (on file with author).
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banking supervisors for their lack of interest in policing the industry's
lending practices. Indeed, the CRA appears to have been aimed as
much at modifying the behavior, norms, and attitudes of the regula-
tors as it was at changing the practices of the lending industry.
Thus, the CRA implicitly sanctioned an important role for local
citizen monitors, whose "regulation from below," as it has been
termed, was believed to be needed to augment the traditional enforce-
ment apparatus (i.e., "regulation from above").5 In places where local
community groups have made active use of the law, the CRA has
proven to be a remarkably effective tool in opening access to credit for
those who have felt previously shunned by the banking system. It is
estimated that the CRA has resulted in the commitment by lenders of
over $30 billion to poor communities around the country.'
Despite its apparent success, or perhaps because of it, the CRA
remains a controversial law. Banking trade groups originally fought
the law's passage in 1977, arguing that it would lead to federally man-
dated credit allocation. Community groups long have complained
about indifferent regulators and weak enforcement. During the past
Congress, elements of the banking industry mounted yet another of-
fensive against the CRA, complaining that the law imposed costly
regulatory burdens on them. Although these efforts to curb the CRA
were thwarted, they are likely to be renewed.7
The new administration's position on the CRA will be critical to
the success of the industry efforts. During the campaign, President
Clinton pledged that he would seek to strengthen the CRA's enforce-
ment, to the delight of community advocates. Yet, the banking inter-
ests are hopeful that the President will be sympathetic to their pleas
for regulatory relief for their industry, including scaling back on some
of the CRA's requirements they find especially burdensome.
As indicated above, the CRA clarifies the public responsibilities of
federally insured financial institutions to their local communities.
The law does this in three important ways. First, it affirms the obliga-
tion of banks and savings institutions to help meet the credit needs
4. See Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAC. L.J. 1071 (1987).
5. See Orin L. McClusky, The Community Reinvestment Act: Is It Doing the Job?,
100 BANKING L.J. 33 (1983).
6. Based on information compiled by the Center for Community Change. and other
sources.
7. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment
Act: An Economic Analysis, 79 VA. L. REV. 291 (1993) (applauding goals of CRA but
arguing that it does more harm than good); Lawrence J. White, The Community Rein-
vestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
281 (1993) (arguing that the CRA is unnecessary and counterproductive).
[Vol. XX
THE CRA AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS
(both housing and non-housing) of the entire communities in which
they are chartered, including low- and moderate-income areas.'
Second, the CRA directs banking and thrift regulators 9 to evaluate
as part of their regular on-site examination the extent to which lend-
ers are meeting local credit needs. 10 Regulations issued jointly by the
four agencies -to implement the law require them to rate these institu-
tions on the basis of their community reinvestment records."1 Third,
the CRA permits regulators to impose sanctions on lenders with weak
records. The law directs the appropriate federal banking agency to
"take [an institution's community reinvestment record] into account
in its evaluation of an application for a deposit facility by such
institution." 2
Regulations for the CRA generally focus on assessing the lender's
community reinvestment record in serving underserved credit needs.
Bank examiners are directed to look at thirteen assessment factors.1 3
The assessments factors are grouped into five performance categories
for evaluation purposes. 4 Lenders are rated for their record within
each performance category and then given one of four possible com-
posite ratings to reflect their overall CRA performance: outstanding,
satisfactory, needs improvement, and substantial non-compliance.
Generally, the CRA exam cycles vary by agency and with the size
of the lending institutions. The most recent CRA ratings affect the
frequency of the exam cycle - ranging from six months for lenders
with poor performance ratings on their last exams, to every twenty-
8. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
9. Federal Reserve Board ("FRB"), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
("OCC"), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), and the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, now the Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS").
10. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
11. See 12 C.F.R. § 25 (OCC); Id. § 228 (FRB); Id. § 345 (FDIC); Id. § 563e (OTS).
12. 12 U.S.C. § 2903 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
13. The assessment factors include the following: (a) activities conducted by the
lender to ascertain the credit needs of its community; (b) originations of residential mort-
gage loans, housing rehabilitation loans, home improvement loans, and small-business or
small-farm loans within its community, or the purchase of such loans originated in its
community; (c) the geographic distribution of credit extensions, credit applications, and
credit denials; (d) participation, including investments, in local community development
and redevelopment projects; and (e) participation in governmentally-insured, guaranteed,
or subsidized loan programs for housing, small businesses, or small farms.
14. (1) ascertainment of community credit needs; (2) marketing and types of credit
offered and extended; (3) geographic distribution and record of opening and closing of-
fices; (4) discrimination and other illegal credit practices; and (5) community develop-
ment activities. For an extended discussion of the five performance categories and the
thirteen assesment criteria therein, see Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Com-
munity Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 165, 199 (1993).
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four months for large national banks, to as long as six or seven years
for small community banks.
To a large extent, examiners rely on information provided by the
lending institutions themselves. Procedures permit examiners to talk
to community groups and public agencies about the community rein-
vestment records of local lenders. These procedures, however, are
used with varying degrees of frequency, depending on the particular
agency and the proclivities of the individual examiner.
II. CRA Improvements Produce New Successes
A. Complaints About Inadequacies in the CRA Enforcement
Process
Almost from the outset, community advocates criticized the way in
which the regulators enforced the CRA. The agencies were viewed as
being too cozy and too protective of the institutions they supervise to
enforce the new requirements effectively.
In 1988, the regulators' laxity in CRA enforcement came under
heavy criticism from Senator Proxmire, then chairman of the Senate
Banking Committee and the law's original sponsor. Proxmire, at the
first formal oversight on the CRA to be conducted by his committee,
opened with this observation:
Let's face it. Redlining hasn't disappeared. Neighborhoods are
still starving for credit. Too many bankers still think the grass is
greener elsewhere .... Regulators seem to think that we're all
living in Lake Woebegone. Like the children of the fictional vil-
lage, U.S. lenders are all above average. Almost all get high rat-
ings year after year and almost none are ever held back. And I ask
myself, how is it that so many neighborhoods are continuing to fail
while so many lending institutions are continuing to pass. This rec-
ord, needless to say, raises questions about whether the examina-
tion process has succeeded. 15
Testimony presented at the oversight hearings emphasized the ex-
tent to which the practice of rating inflation had hampered the use of
the examination process to encourage lenders to better address their
CRA responsibilities. The panel learned that the CRA examination
had become virtually fail-safe for lenders, with a paltry 2.4% of the
26,000 CRA examinations conducted by federal regulators from
1985-1988 resulting in poor grades being assigned (i.e., less than satis-
factory or below).
15. Discrimination in Home Mortgage Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1989) (emphasis added).
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Although Proxmire's committee made no formal recommenda-
tions, the hearings appear to have had an impact on regulatory en-
forcement. Within twelve months, the four agencies issued new CRA
policy guidelines in which they emphasized that deeds and not merely
promises would receive greater weight in future CRA examinations.16
In addition, the following year Congress amended the CRA to require
federal regulators for the first time to disclose their written CRA eval-
uations and ratings for individual lenders. 7 The disclosure require-
ment was intended to spur reforms in the CRA evaluation process.
B. Leverage for Neighborhood Groups
From the standpoint of grassroots citizens' organizations, unques-
tionably the most important feature of the CRA is that it provides
implicit standing for them to intervene in lender expansion applica-
tion proceedings. Banking law, either by statute or regulation, rou-
tinely provides opportunities for public comment on pending financial
institution expansion requests (mergers, acquisitions, branch openings
and relocations of existing facilities). To reach a final decision, regu-
lators have broad discretion in weighing an applicant's record, but
evidence presented through the public comment process must be re-
viewed. While the CRA itself is vague and the regulatory process
complex, the law has provided community groups with substantial
leverage to end disinvestment practices and to obtain commitments
from lenders to undertake new community reinvestment initiatives.
When an expansion application is submitted by a lender with a
weak CRA record, the regulators have the option to deny the requests
or approve the request conditioned upon the applicant undertaking
specific actions to improve its record. For example, in 1989 the Fed-
eral Reserve Board denied the merger application by the Continental
Bank Corporation of Illinois to acquire an Arizona bank.'8 The
Center for Community Change, a national non-profit organization
that advises community groups involved in CRA activities, estimates
that since the CRA's inception in 1978, federal regulators have denied
approximately fifteen expansion requests on CRA grounds and
granted conditional approval imposing CRA requirements in roughly
fifty to sixty cases.
16. See 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742 (1989) (Joint Policy Statement on the CRA issued by the
FRB, OCC, FDIC and OTS).
17. Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1212(b), 103 Stat. 587 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2906
(Supp. 11 1990)).
18. See 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 304 (1989) (FRB order denying request by Continental
Bank Corporation to acquire Grand Canyon Bank of Arizona).
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Interestingly, despite its popularity with local groups, the CRA
challenge has rarely worked the way its drafters originally envisioned
it would. During the law's initial ten years, only eight of an estimated
40,000 expansion applications acted upon by federal regulators during
this period were denied on CRA grounds.19 Instead, the effectiveness
of the CRA challenge process usually rests with the ability of the
community group leaders to use the law to negotiate an agreement
under which applicants make specific commitments to improve their
community reinvestment records. If such an agreement is reached,
the community group protestant withdraws its challenge and the ap-
plication continues to be processed by the regulator. Community
groups viewed negotiated settlements as preferable to outright appli-
cation denials, or even to the types of conditional orders typically im-
posed by the regulators.
Often these negotiated settlements are quite detailed, spelling out
the steps to be taken by the applicant lending institution to step up its
activity in low- and moderate-income and minority communities.
Although neither sanctioned nor enforced by the federal regulators,
this informal dispute resolution mechanism is viewed by community
groups as the heart of the CRA process. It is estimated that since the
CRA's enactment, community groups have negotiated more than $7.5
billion in commitments from lenders. Moreover, lenders have made
an additional $23 billion worth of unilateral commitments to commu-
nity development lending while their expansion requests were pending
before federal regulatory bodies. Thus, the CRA is credited with re-
sulting in total commitments in excess of $30 billion to poor commu-
nities throughout the country, far exceeding whatever conditions
would have been imposed by regulators.
The commitments obtained from lenders have been impressive on
paper, but community groups have learned that translating promises
into actual performance is a demanding task. Nevertheless, the in-
creasing numbers of successful reinvestment partnerships stemming
from CRA agreements provide ample testament to the importance of
this strategy to local communities.
C. CRA Settlement Agreements And Unilateral Lender Initiatives
Many community advocates believe that the negotiated CRA
agreements are the best means for ensuring changes in the manner in
which lenders operate in low- and moderate-income and predomi-
nately minority neighborhoods. And indeed, the elements contained
19. Based on estimates developed by the Center for Community Change.
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in many agreements clearly exceed the types of provisions featured in
conditional approval orders by the regulators. Two types of negoti-
ated agreements and examples of lender initiated reinvestment com-
mitments are discussed below.
In 1984, three large lending institutions, the First National Bank of
Chicago, Harris Trust and Savings Banks, and the Northern Trust
Company, announced they had committed $153 million over a five
year span as a result of negotiations with the Chicago Reinvestment
Alliance, a grouping of neighborhood organizations and not-for-profit
community development corporations. The funds were targeted for
single family and multi-family housing, mixed use buildings, and
small business loans. The agreements were extended at the end of the
initial period for an additional five years and expanded to commit-
ments totalling $200 million.2"
By almost any measure the agreements have succeeded. By August
1989, $117.5 million was generated for 572 loans, producing or main-
taining nearly 5,000 housing units. All but one loan were performing.
The programs provided new loan products, developed new markets
for the banks involved, and established models for future partnerships
between lenders and non-profit organizations.2 1
Another approach has been pioneered by the Association of Com-
munity Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN"), a national
membership organization representing lower income people in com-
munities throughout the country. ACORN has sought to apply prin-
ciples from collective bargaining between unions and employers to the
community reinvestment field. Thus, ACORN has used "pattern bar-
gaining" to negotiate similar types of reinvestment agreements with
different lenders. Through this approach ACORN has been able to
introduce a standardized home ownership program into different
communities in which it has local chapters.22
The ACORN program includes the use of flexible, below market
rate mortgage products, the use of non-standard underwriting criteria
that recognizes the different sets of needs for low-income households,
the provision of counseling both before and after the loan application
process, and the application of the land trust model of ownership
which is built into the mortgage instrument to ensure long-term af-
20. CALVIN BRADFORD, NATIONAL TRAINING AND INFORMATION CENTER, PART-
NERSHIP FOR REINVESTMENT: AN EVALUATION OF THE CHICAGO NEIGHBORHOOD
LENDING PROGRAM 4 (1990).
21. Status of the Community Reinvestment Act, S. REP. No. 121, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. 25 (1992) [hereinafter CRA Status Report].
22. Id. at 26.
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fordability for low-income families. ACORN has succeeded in con-
vincing lenders to use the program in such cities as Brooklyn,
Chicago, Dallas, Philadelphia, Phoenix, St. Louis and Washington,
D.C. The ACORN program has greatly increased the approval rates
for mortgages submitted by low income families, while default rates
remain comparable or even lower than other mortgages made by par-
ticipating lenders.
The spate of CRA agreements has influenced some lenders to
"jump the gun" and unilaterally announce expanded reinvestment ef-
forts they plan to undertake. These efforts are intended to offset ex-
pected community group challenges to future expansion requests.
Thus, NCNB and C&S Sovran announced that it would set aside $10
billion for an expanded community reinvestment initiative at the time
it was seeking to merge to become NationsBank. Chemical Bank of
New York made a similar commitment while seeking Federal Reserve
Board approval for its merger with Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Bank.
Not to be outdone, Bank of America announced its plans for a ten
year, $12 billion commitment for CRA-related activities at the time of
its proposed merger with Security Pacific. The bank's program in-
cluded: (a) $750 million per year for loans to targeted low-income
census tracts and the expansion of special mortgage products for
lower income and minority borrowers; (b) $150 million per year for
development and long term financing of low-income housing; (c) $100
million per year under government-guaranteed and other special pro-
grams for small businesses; (d) $200 million per year for conventional
small business loans under $50,000; and (e) $12 million annually
under a consumer loan program with modified underwriting and
credit terms intended to accommodate the needs of lower income
families.23
Most CRA activists are skeptical of unilateral lender initiatives, es-
pecially those that do not appear to result from careful assessments of
the credit needs of their local communities. Whatever their limita-
tions, the fact that these initiatives occurred when they did indicates
the great importance that lenders attach to insulating themselves from
criticism during pending restructuring requests.
III. The Impact of Public Disclosure of CRA Evaluations and
Ratings
In 1989, Congress amended the CRA to require federal banking
23. Id. at 26-27.
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regulators to disclose to the public written CRA evaluations and rat-
ings for individual lending institutions. The publication of informa-
tion on lender performance expanded the scope of the CRA and
established it as a "right to know" law.
Ratings disclosure reflected a basic Congressional dissatisfaction
with the adequacy of the CRA examination process in the absence of
community group challenges to expansion requests. Congress hoped
that putting this information into the hands of the public would: (1)
exert pressure on the regulators to improve the quality of the exami-
nations and curb rating inflation; and (2) provide the public and lend-
ers alike with a better understanding of the underlying performance
standards employed by the regulators in assigning the CRA ratings.24
The amendment's sponsor in the House of Representatives, Repre-
sentative Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr., commented:
Although bank examination reports, including the CRA exam re-
ports, have traditionally not been made available to the public, the
[House Banking] Committee found public disclosure of the CRA
exam reports to be essential if the public and bankers are to acquire
a clear understanding of the standards used by the agencies in the
CRA evaluations and ratings. It is only by re-viewing how the
agencies have evaluated the facts and rated CRA performance in
specific cases that one can gain a sense of the underlying
standards.25
Senator Proxmire also underscored the need to reform the CRA exam
process: "Regulators are inclined to be friendly and favorable and
supportive of the people they regulate. Disclosure is a cleansing, dis-
ciplining force here. "26
The preliminary experience to date suggests that public disclosure
has somewhat curbed the rating inflation that was prevalent in the
mid-1980's. Since the ratings began to be published in mid-1990, the
regulators have assigned fewer high grades and more low ones. Yet,
much less is known about how the shift in the ratings distribution has
altered the lending practices of banking institutions.
Over the course of the first twenty-four months that public disclo-
sure was in effect (July 1, 1990 to June 30, 1992), about two-thirds of
all lenders were examined for CRA purposes (9,520 out of approxi-
mately 14,400 covered by the law). Of the lenders rated, 929 (9.7%)
24. Conference Report on the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforce-
ment Act, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 54, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 460 (1989).
25. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 209, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 364 (1988).
26. Provisions Aimed at Strengthening the Community Reinvestment Act: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1988) [hereinafter CRA Hearings].
1993]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
were rated as outstanding; 7,565 (79%) as satisfactory; 939 (9.8%)
lenders were rated as needing to improve; and 87 (.9%) banks were
judged to be in substantial non-compliance. Overall, this represents
about an 11% "failure" rate (needs to improve or substantial non-
compliance). Thus, the post-disclosure rating distribution represents
nearly a five-fold increase in the failure rate from the three year period
immediately preceding adoption of the new requirement, in which
only about 2.5% of lenders were found to have failed.27
Federally-insured savings institutions fared worse than commercial
banks. Figures released by the Office of Thrift Supervision indicate
that fully 19% of savings institutions received a failing grade (272 out
of 1,370 examined), compared to failure rates of 13.7% for the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (182 out of 1316 examined), 9%
for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (460 out of 5,454 ex-
amined), and 9% for the Federal Reserve Board (112 out of 1,280
examined). Assuming these patterns hold, by the time the first cycle
of the CRA ratings are made public, about 130 lenders will have re-
ceived substantial non-compliance ratings. Perhaps another 1400-
1500 lenders will have received needs improvement ratings. These
institutions could provide an important database to study the subse-
quent effects of ratings disclosure on lender performance.
A. Is More Enough?
There appears to be little question but that the regulators and lend-
ers are devoting considerably more attention to the CRA than they
did prior to institution of the disclosure requirements. Whether in-
creased attention, however, translates into demonstrable improve-
ments in lending performance is more difficult to track.
At the FDIC, the average time devoted to a CRA exam has in-
creased from seven hours in 1989 to thirty hours in 1991. At the
OCC, the total hours spent on the CRA exams increased from 12,064
in 1989 to 84,840 in 1991. The Federal Reserve and the OTS also
showed similar increases, with the exception of the time devoted to
very large lenders. Surprisingly, for institutions with over $1 billion in
assets examiner time devoted to the CRA exams actually dropped
during this same two year period.2 s
Similarly, the CRA ratings disclosures have propelled many lenders
to improve their outreach and communications with local community
groups. In fact, a whole industry of CRA consultants has sprung up
27. BROWN, supra note 3, at 9.
28. Statistics compiled by the Center for Community Change.
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to advise lenders on methods for boosting their CRA records in order
to obtain favorable ratings from their regulator. But the question re-
mains whether ratings disclosure is improving the flow of credit to
underserved segments of our society.
One reason for the lack of certainty about the correlation between
ratings and lending performance is the uneven quality of the written
evaluation reports prepared by the agencies. The 1989 amendment to
the CRA made clear that the disclosure documents should not be
boilerplate or conclusionary summaries, but rather that they must set
forth the facts supporting the regulator's conclusions for each assess-
ment factor.
Staff from the Housing Subcommittee of the Senate Banking Com-
mittee reviewed a large sampling of the CRA evaluations drawn from
each agency and representing lenders of all sizes and from all regions
of the country. The subsequent report issued by the Subcommittee
found that "[t]he evaluations reviewed justify for the most part the
harsh criticisms about their quality.- The evaluations range from ex-
cellent to unacceptable. Unfortunately, the excellent ones are few and
inadequate ones are the norm.29
The Subcommittee suggests that one reason for the lack of quality
in the evaluation reports is attributable to the failure of the regulators
to adopt well-articulated standards for evaluating lender performance.
The panel recommended that the quality of the evaluation reports be
substantially improved.
B. Ratings Disclosure and Greenlining
Public disclosure of the CRA ratings and evaluations appears to be
stimulating some new approaches for encouraging improvements in
lender performance. One strategy centers on using the placement of
deposits and investments in banking institutions with demonstrated
commitments to community reinvestment. "Greenlining" strategies
were employed to deter redlining even prior to the CRA's enactment
and state and local units of government have experimented with the
placement of public funds based upon social criteria.. However, in the
past these strategies were greatly handicapped by the lack of uniform
criteria for rating individual lenders. .
Seventeen state governments and nine large cities have instituted
some type of linked-deposit program that ties the placement of public
funds to some specific lending activity requirements. Cincinnati, Los
Angeles, Newark, New York, Pittsburgh and St. Paul are among the
29. See CRA Status Report, supra note 21, at 48 (emphasis added).
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municipalities whose linked deposit ordinances use the CRA evalua-
tions as part of their weighting criteria.
Moreover, the public disclosure requirements have opened up the
opportunities for churches, labor unions, professional associations,
and charitable organizations to use the CRA performance ratings to
guide them on the placement of their funds. For example, the Ameri-
can Bar Association became the first professional association to adopt
policies for itself and for the encouragement of its members to bank
with lending institutions with good CRA records.
The potential reach of the CRA ratings information is great. Amer-
ican Banker, a banking trade daily, surveyed consumers to determine
the impact of a lender's community reinvestment record on their
choice of institutions. The newspaper found that one-third of all con-
sumers surveyed said they would switch their accounts from lending
institutions with a poor CRA record. The figure was even higher
among minority consumers, one-half of whom said they would be in-
fluenced in where they banked by a lender's CRA record.
IV. Legislative Proposals to Modify the CRA
In response to banking industry urgings, several legislative propos-
als were offered during the past Congress to limit the reach of the
CRA. These proposals generally fell into two categories: (1) provid-
ing safe harbors from challenges to expansion requests for lenders re-
ceiving passing grades from the regulators; and (2) exempting small
banks from the CRA's coverage altogether. Neither of these meas-
ures had been acted upon before Congress adjourned.
A. Safe Harbors
The safe harbor provision would narrow the situations in which
community groups could contest lending institution expansion re-
quests. This proposal is strongly supported by some of the nation's
largest banks, especially those who have been victims of recent CRA
challenges to their mergers and acquisitions. These interests argue
that lenders receiving good ratings from federal regulators should be
protected from the delays associated with community groups using
the expansion application process to raise CRA issues.
Community advocates, on the other hand, vehemently opposed
proposals to limit public input into the application review process.
These groups contend that the public would have no way to comment
on proposed bank actions that would have great impact on their com-
munity. According to this view, the opportunity for public comment
should not be determined solely by the CRA ratings, which even the
304 [Vol. XX
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regulators would concede are far from perfect and in many cases not
particularly current (the OCC examines some national banks as infre-
quently as once every seven years).
Additionally, although it is frequently asserted by safe harbor pro-
ponents that the CRA challenges result in unwarranted and costly
delays in processing, the facts appear to speak otherwise. According
to the FRB, the average processing time for applications under a
CRA protest has been two days shorter than the average processing
time for non-protested applications processed by the agency (seventy-
three versus seventy-five days).3"
B. Small Bank Exemption
Small and rural banks also have been actively advocating their ex-
emption from the CRA. Depending on the formula used, the exemp-
tions discussed could exempt as much as 87% of the banking industry
from the CRA's coverage. The rationale for this proposal is that
small banks, almost by definition, must be community-minded and,
therefore, should not be burdened by requirements like the CRA.
The evidence suggests that size is not a perfect measurement of how
well a lender is serving local credit needs. For one thing, not all small
banks are active lenders in their communities. For example, a recent
report by the House Banking Committee found that banks with under
$100 million in assets, which are generally defined as "community"
banks, had a lower loan to asset ratio than did banks whose asset size
exceeded $10 billion (55% compared to 63%). Second, there is data
to suggest that smaller banks are the worst CRA performers. Ac-
cording to K.H. Thomas Associates, a consultant to banks, 71% of
the banks that received the lowest CRA ratings category between
1990 and 1992 had assets of less than $100 million.
Smaller banks assert that an exemption from the CRA is justified
because the law imposes a heavy and unnecessary regulatory burden
on them. These claims are part of a broader industry effort to seek
curtailment of government regulation of banks in general and of
smaller banks in particular. 31 A recent American Bankers Associa-
tion survey cited the CRA as the greatest regulatory concern.
Community advocates, however, respond that bankers are using the
regulatory burden issue merely as a stalking horse to win curtailments
in the law's coverage. They note that the CRA and its implementing
regulations do not require lenders to file any reports at all. Under the
30. See CRA Hearings, supra note 26, at 356-57.
31. See, e.g., Macey & Miller, supra note 7; White, supra note 7, at 282.
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regulations for the CRA, lenders need only adopt a "CRA State-
ment," post a "CRA Notice" in the lobbies of their branches, and
maintain a "CRA Public File" in their main offices. In the CRA
Statement, the lender simply describes its lending territory and the
types of credit it offers. In the CRA Notice, the lender simply states
how the public can get a copy of the CRA Statement and where to
send comments about the institution's CRA performance. The CRA
Public File simply contains public comments received and the lender's
response.
The Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") recently con-
firmed the slim compliance burden associated with the CRA. In
1991, OMB analyzed the hours that banks regulated by the Federal
Reserve spent complying with various consumer compliance regula-
tions. Of all the laws reviewed, OMB reported that the CRA was the
least burdensome - on average, OMB found that the banks studied
spent only six hours per year complying with the law.32
Notwithstanding the actual compliance burden associated with the
CRA, the reinvestment law seems to generate a special animus that
other consumer protection laws do not. Why is this? Two factors
appear to be fueling recent lender efforts to weaken the CRA: the
onset of the new public disclosure requirements, and the compliance
techniques employed by the regulators.
Undoubtedly, public disclosure of the CRA ratings has generated a
great deal of anxiety among lenders. These institutions know that the
stakes are greater than ever to pass regulatory muster. Those that
have already received poor grades worry about the impact of these
ratings on their future expansion requests. They also worry about
how these grades will be received in the "court of public opinion,"
which may turn out to be a far tougher regulator than the federal
agencies. Meanwhile, the lenders that have yet to be examined
(about one-third of all banks and savings institutions) know that be-
tween ten to eleven percent of them will receive a failing grade and
they are worried about it.
Another source of frustration appears to have stemmed from the
message lenders received from their regulators in the wake of ratings
disclosure. At first, they were told to "document, document, docu-
ment" all the activities undertaken in fulfillment of their CRA respon-
sibilities. Many lenders apparently inferred from this that the
regulators were more interested in paper trails than they were in ac-
tual lending. As a result, the regulators unwittingly contributed to
32. Bill Atkinson, Complying With Regulations: A Costly and Growing Burden, AM.
BANKER, June 24, 1991, at 1.
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the perception that expanded record keeping was required in the new
CRA environment.
The American Bankers Association appears to have been guilty of
overzealousness as well in the guidance it provided to its members.
The trade association itself developed a 475-page CRA compliance
manual. The guidebook suggests that lenders maintain fifteen sepa-
rate files and various subfiles to document their CRA performance.
The manual also provides more than eighty pages of suggested forms
to use to satisfy agency examiners. It was this type of guidance that
led the Cranston Subcommittee to suggest: "the banking industry it-
self may be inadvertently contributing to the problem of emphasizing
documentation rather than performance."33
However, by June 1992, the regulatory agencies had issued formal
policy guidelines instructing lenders that no new documentation was
needed for lenders to pass CRA muster:
The documentation expected by the agencies is primarily that
which is useful to the institution's own management needs. In a
well-managed CRA program a financial institution's board of di-
rectors and management use relevant documentation to make sure
their programs are working as planned. The agencies can use this
documentation in their assessment of the institution's CRA per-
formance and make sure that a proper level of management over-
sight of the institution's CRA program is in place.
[I]nformation that the institution prepares and maintains for its
own management use should demonstrate the level of CRA per-
formance. The agencies do not expect detailed documentation of
every contact or finding to effectively demonstrate performance.34
In the same joint guidance statement, the agencies indicated that they
evaluate a bank on its actual performance and not on the paper trail it
produces:
CRA ratings should be based on an institution's performance (pri-
marily the granting of loans, also technical support for community
development efforts, and other activities that help make credit
available to members of the community), not on the amount of
documentation it maintains. The lack of documentation is not suf-
ficient basis on which to grant a poor rating if performance can
otherwise be determined to be satisfactory or better. a
Thus, supporters of the CRA argue that the banking trade groups'
33. See CRA Status Report, supra note 21, at 7.
34. Press Release from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (June
17, 1992) (on file with author).
35. Id.
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real agenda goes well beyond paperwork - that the groups simply do
not like the type of public regulation that the CRA represents, and
that the groups believe the CRA impermissibly dictates how lending
institutions must conduct their business.
V. Conclusion: What Is Likely To Happen Next?
The next few years are likely to be important ones for the CRA.
For much of its history, the CRA has been administered by regulators
who have been hostile or indifferent to carrying out the law's intent.
President Clinton indicated during the campaign that he viewed the
CRA more positively than did his recent predecessors. And indeed,
the new administration will have an important, perhaps historic, op-
portunity to enable the CRA to achieve its full potential.
Much of what is needed is tougher, more aggressive enforcement of
the existing CRA law. It is not the lack of laws, but rather lackluster
enforcement of the CRA, that has contributed to the continuance of
neighborhood disinvestment and lending discrimination. The ap-
pointment of agency chiefs committed to the CRA's full and effective
implementation would go a long way toward stimulating the flow of
credit to capital-starved neighborhoods and rural communities.
Traditionally, Presidential appointments to fill the banking regula-
tory agencies have been drawn from a small pool - the financial serv-
ices industry itself, large law firms and Wall Street. These slots have
been filled with individuals who know or care little about the rules
governing community reinvestment or fair lending enforcement.
Consequently, the regulators have tended to view the constituency to
be served as the industry itself, rather than the broader public interest.
The Clinton Administration can use its appointment power to
break with the past record of neglect. A progressive set of regulators
willing to put the public interest first could accomplish much. The
following are a few suggestions for improving CRA enforcement:
(1) Focus the CRA examination process more closely on verifia-
ble lender performance by conducting tougher, more rigorous as-
sessments and increasing the opportunities for public input into the
evaluation process.
(2) Make greater use of available enforcement powers, such as
cease and desist orders and denials of expansion requests, for lend-
ers with weak CRA records.
(3) Standardize the CRA performance evaluation reports. The
reports should contain statistical information to provide the public
with information about the extent to which lending institutions
make mortgages, small business loans and small farm loans to low-
[Vol. XX
THE CRA AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS
and moderate-income and minority borrowers and neighborhoods
(or the equivalent rural area designation).
(4) Improve access to the CRA performance evaluations. The
public should be able to obtain copies of the CRA reports by con-
tacting a toll-free telephone number.
(5) Hold public hearings on all lender expansion requests raising
significant CRA issues or affecting multiple-state markets areas.
Perhaps more than anything else, the new administration needs to
appreciate the role of citizen monitors in the CRA process. The ex-
periment with the use of "de facto" bank examiners to augment the
formal regulatory apparatus has been the strongest component of the
CRA. "Regulation from below" has nudged lending institutions to
pay more attention to the capital needs of underserved communities
and consumers. The new regulators must be careful not to ignore the
importance of community-based watchdogs of the CRA in their ef-
forts to reform the administration of the reinvestment law.
At the same time, community groups must keep pace with the
changing CRA environment. Local citizens' groups have successfully
negotiated affirmative lending agreements, usually by threatening to
stop or delay mergers by intervening in the federal regulatory process.
With many mergers on the horizon, lending institutions have become
more sophisticated in dealing with community groups. The new
CRA and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act requirements have made
the compliance process much clearer. Both of these factors could re-
duce the leverage that community groups have learned to exercise.
As a result, grassroots organizations are attempting to adapt their
strategies. The advent of the CRA ratings disclosure has led to specu-
lation from some quarters that the action will now shift away from
application challenges to the examination process. Indeed, some re-
cent policy pronouncements from the regulators indicate that the
CRA evaluations will be controlling the way they handle community
group challenges to expansion requests. Consequently, savvy commu-
nity groups are already experimenting with new approaches before
they seek to bring CRA challenges.
For example, community groups are starting to collect and review
the CRA ratings and performance evaluations from their local banks.
The Massachusetts Affordable Housing Alliance recently released an
in-depth report analyzing the CRA ratings received by state-based
lending institutions. Meanwhile, the Delaware Community Reinvest-
ment Action Council complained to federal regulators about the rat-
ing assigned to a local lender, as have Chicago and Los Angeles
community groups. These groups recognize that unless they chal-
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lenge ratings they disagree with, their silence is likely to be interpreted
as tacit acceptance of the accuracy of agency evaluations, which may
impair future challenges the groups may seek to bring.
At the same time, deregulation, new technologies and increased
competition, both foreign and domestic, are dramatically changing
how lending institutions view their geographic markets and deploy
their assets. In the near future, we can expect to see a substantially
different banking system - one with larger and fewer banks operating
multistate branch networks and offering a wide array of financial serv-
ices. The CRA remains one of the few tools that communities have to
ward off the possible disinvestment consequences of full-fledged bank
restructuring. Yet, the CRA may not be sufficient to withstand all
these new forces.
Despite the perception by many bankers that lending in low and
moderate income areas is too risky and unprofitable,36 the experience
over the last fifteen years has debunked these myths. Numerous ex-
amples of successful community reinvestment partnerships that have
come into being since the CRA's enactment demonstrate that lending
to the residents of older urban neighborhoods is both prudent and
profitable for banking institutions. These CRA success stories pro-
vide proof that the law is most effective when financial institutions
integrate it fully into their mission and their business strategy. Some
bankers now even acknowledge that if more in their industry stuck to
the less glamorous but sounder policies of lending to their local com-
munities, their industry today would be in far sounder financial
condition.
The CRA will likely need to be adapted to cover bank entry into
nonbanking activities (securities and insurance underwriting and mu-
tual money market funds). Similarly, geographic expansion through
interstate branching would appear to necessitate changes to the CRA,
such as requiring nationwide institutions to spell out their commit-
ments to individual communities and to provide more detailed report-
ing of their lending activities within individual markets. To be sure,
the CRA will continue to draw criticism from certain circles, but as a
recent Congressional report on the status of the CRA concluded,
"[t]he message is clear. CRA is a law whose purpose is as relevant
today as it was when it was written 15 years ago. This issue is not the
law, but its implementation and enforcement."37
36. See White, supra note 7, at 285-87, (arguing that banks must "cross-subsidize"
the risky and unprofitable CRA-induced services, by earning above-normal profits in
other operations).
37. See CRA Status Report, supra note 21, at 6.
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